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IN BUSINESS CYCLESPART ONE
THEORETICAL APPROACH
The Nature of the Study
THE reader should be warned at the start that this
study is not exclusively or mainly devoted to the
current depression, but is a study of business cycles
in general, as they have been experienced during the
period for which fairly comprehensive and organ-
ized statistical records have been gathered. The
special features of the present catastrophe are rather
briefly dealt with in Part IV, and the trends of the
post-War period leading up to it in Part III. By set-
ting the crisis against the background of experience
some well-founded idea may be gained of the extent
to which it resembles other depressions, the extent
to which its extraordinary severity and persistence
are due to unique causes that may not reappear, and
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the extent to which they are due to changes in the
economic system that introduce new elements with
which we shall have to reckon in the future, and
which may make future cycles more serious than
those of the recent past. The peculiarly grave and
threatening character of the present emergency
needs no proof. As to how close it has brought us to
a complete collapse of our economic system econo-
mists, like others, can only conjecture. When such
questions can be definitely answered, it is always too
late to make use of the answer.
The origin and purpose of this study have been
explained in the introduction. The special objective
assigned was the attempt to select, among the many
factors involved in business cycles, a limited number
which have especial strategic importance. The task is
not primarily one of statistical description nor of
statistical analysis in the usual sense. It is perhaps
better described as an application of theoretical
analysis to an unusually comprehensive array of con-
crete data. Thus, while the study deals with statisti-
cal materials, it makes no attempt to present a com-
plete or voluminous statistical picture of the history
of business cycles. Other studies of the latter charac-
ter are under way; and it would be neither useful
nor proper to attempt to duplicate or anticipate
them.
In trying to pick out factors of special significance,
the question arises on what basis significance is to be
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judged. It may be judged from the standpoint of an
objective diagnosis seeking to learn what brings
about the conditions we observe, and suffer from; or
it may be judged with a more pragmatic eye to con-
trolling these results. The two approaches are not
wholly distinct, since results can often best be con-
trolled indirectly, via their causes, and can never be
controlled without taking these causes into the
reckoning. But the ultimate purpose justifying such
an investigation is to help toward doing something
to improve conditions; and toward this end, causes
we cannot control do not have the same grade of
significance as those whose action we can modify.
They still have to be reckoned with, but in a differ-
ent and more limited fashion.
Let us say that variations of weather, acting on
agriculture, cause changes in supplies of raw prod-
ucts; and that in our economic system these cause
changes in prices and in demands for other products,
and so play a part in the general business cycle. The
weather itself we shall not, in the present state of
our meteorological knowledge, attempt to control;
but we may search the economic system for factors
responsible for the economic disturbances that come
about, changes in weather being taken for granted.
And having found factors about which something
can be done, we shall focus attention on them. The
weather, if we could learn enough about it, might
tell us how to time some of our safeguarding meas-
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ures; but not what measures to take. Thus we may
fairly say that the weather has only a secondary
grade of significance.. The possibility of control,
then, is one of the keys—perhaps not the only one—
to the human significance of causes. For this reason
it will be kept in mind throughout our study. On the
other hand, details as to ways and means of control
are not our present concern. They constitute the
next step.
The special purpose this study may serve can be
expressed in another way. Theoretical studies give
us causes that are too few and too simple, such as
over-production, under-consumption, over-saving, or
failure to distribute to laborers their whole product
or enough of the whole product of industry to enable
them to buy the things they have produced. Induc-
tive studies, on the other hand, reveal so many factors
at work, so completely interrelated, that we are likely
to come to the conclusion that everything is both
cause and effect, and everything is the result of nearly
everything else, or that all features of modern indus-
trialism are jointly responsible for the business cycle.
The attempt in the present study is to steer a course
between these two extremes, including anything
which a well-rounded survey of the facts can suggest,
but selecting those factors which seem to have the
greatest strategic importance, if any can be picked
out. A factor may be said to have strategic impor-
tance if it has real power to control other factors, and
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to determine the general character of the result; and
it has peculiar strategic importance if, in addition,
we have power to control it;if it is not, like the
weather, beyond the reach of anything we can now
do.
The field of study will be construed somewhat
broadly. The most clearly marked cycles are rela-
tively short wave-like movements of general business,
which in this country vary from two to five years in
length, with an average length of about forty months.
But it would be arbitrary to limit our study to these
short cycles and still more arbitrary to focus atten-
tion on their usual course. Differences between suc-
cessive short cycles are important, and may yield
evidence of the existence of longer cycles, or at least
of longer movements. And any movements are sig-
nificant which manifest phenomena similar to those
that make the problem of business cycles sach a seri-
ous one. Lack of equilibrium, unemployment and
inability to use all of our existing powers of produc-
tion, or even a reasonably large proportion of them
—these are all properly parts of our study, in what-
ever forms we find them.
The materials upon which this essay is based are,
for the most part, those collected by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, together with studies
made by a special staff consisting of members of this
Bureau and others, engaged in an investigation of
the cycle ending with the current great depression,
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and working in collaboration with the Committee
on Recent Economic Changes. These studies have
been discussed in joint meetings of the special staff
and the Committee. Among the materials of the
National Bureau of Economic Research, the most
extensive use has been made of a set of series especi-
ally prepared on a common pattern devised by Dr.
Mitchell for the purpose of affording comparable
pictures of cycles of different lengths. A. brief de-
scription is here given of the essential features of the
scheme on which these series were prepared. It is
necessarily somewhat difficult and technical, but the
reader is asked to be patient with it, since it is neces-
sary to an understanding of the nature of the evi-
dence underlying the main findings of this study.
More specifically, the object of these specially pre-
pared series was to make possible a composite picture
of the average cyclical pattern of each single series—
pig iron production, car-loadings, etc.—in the face
of two outstanding difficulties. The first arose from
the very different lengths of the successive cycles of
general business, and the second from the further
fact that the single series have their own cycles which
do not agree exactly with the cycles of general busi-
ness, and are aiso of different lengths.'
For a brief description of these specially prepared series see the article
on "Business Cycles" by W. C. Mitchell in the Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. A [uller development will appear in Dr. Mitchell's forthcoming
second volume on Business Cycles, which will also be published by
the National Bureau of Economic Research. It would be clearly in-
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The problem of differing lengths of different
cycles is met by dividing each cycle up into the same
number of 'stages'. One of three months represents
the point at which the trough is reached and expan-
sion begins, another of three months represents the
point at which thç peak is reached and recession be-
gins, while each individual expansion and recession
is arbitrarily divided into three equal parts, which
will of course be longer in a cycle of four years than
in one of two. Thus each cycle is divided into eight
or nine if we include the revival which marks
the end of that cycle andL the beginning of the next.
This is done both for the cycles of general business
and for the 'specific cycles' which appear in the par-
ticular series, and which do not have the same tim-
ing as the general business curve, though some of
them follow it very closely.
The movements of each series—for example, pig
iron production—are then tabulated in two ways.
First, the average rates of pig iron production in the
successive stages of the general business cycles are
recorded(in terms of percentages of the average
appropriate to publish these same tables and charts in the present
essay, and this may serve to explain why the evidence on which this
study rests is not presented in full. Short of this, the writer has en-
deavored to indicate the basis of his statenients by describing the be-
havior of the series. And in order that such descriptions may be
understood, the character of these special series must be explained.
The reader who wishes fuller verification is referred to Dr. Mitchell's
forthcoming book.
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value for the cycle) and second, a similar record is
made of the rates of pig iron production in the suc-
cessive stages of the cycles marked off by the high
and low points of pig iron production itself, which
may not come at exactly the same times as the high
and low points of general business. The second table
gives the 'specific cycles' of pig iron production it-
self, while the first table gives the behavior of pig
iron production during the successive phases of the
reference cycle or cycle of general business. Finally,
the successive cyclical curves, both reference and
specific, are averaged into a composite picture of
average behavior for a series of cycles.
As a matter of interest we reproduce Dr. Mitchell's
table of standard reference dates for the United
States.2 The dates, based upon a study of business
annals and the best statistical indicators of business
activity available, purport to show the month and
year of successive revivals and recessions in general
business activity. As Dr. Mitchell says:
it cannot be claimed that the reference dates are
more than fair approximations to the central
points in a long succession of turns that occur in
the economic activities of a nation.
Quite apart from doubts whether we have
made the best choices of reference dates, we recog-
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nize that recession and revival are changes in the
condition of business which take much more than
a month. They are not turning points, but turning
periods. It is probable that on the average more
than a year elapses from the time when the activi-
ties which respond most promptly to changes in
business prospects turn upward or downward, to
the time when the most sluggish activities respond
to the changes which have already taken place in
other parts of the economic system. To date one
of these turns by a single month is therefore arbi-
trary. But we need some set of bench-marks in
time by which to record the sequence in which the
specific cycles of different business factors make
their cyclical turns. The reference dates serve that
purpose.
The specific cycles of pig iron production, for ex-
ample, approximate so closely in respect of timing
the cycles of general business that there is little dif-
ference in that respect between the two curves. But
there are large discrepancies between the specific
cycles of construction contracts or volume of stock
exchange transactions and general business cycles.
The former show large leads with peaks occurring,
on the average, well ahead of the peaks of general
business. And the fact that the peaks of the reference
cycle curves for 'these series are considerably lower
than the peaks of their own specific cycles registersTHEORETICAL APPROACH
the fact that their peaks occur at different stages of
successive general business cycles. If there were a
consistent and uniform lead, the amplitudes of the
specific and reference cycles would be the same.
When such discrepancies appear, it is a signal to
the student to turn from the composite pictures of
average cycle patterns to a study of the behavior of
the series cycle by cycle. Indeed, the writer has found
it desirable to do this wherever it was a question of
comparing the behavior of different factors which
bear a vital relation to one another. For this purpose
the writer has used the device of charting the be-
havior of one factor through a series of cycles, and
below it the behavior of related factors through the
same series of cycles. These charts themselves are not
presented in this study, largely because the transition
from one cycle to the next makes this type of chart
confusing to the eye. The conclusions drawn from
them are used, since they serve especially to show
whether resemblances in the average cycle patterns
of different series represent truly consistent behavior
in which each single cycle exhibits the same resem-
blance. In what follows, attention is thus paid not
merely to the average patterns but also to the varia-
tions from cycle to cycle.
Framework of a Theory
It may be worth while at the start to outline in
the most general terms the form which the results of
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this study are to take, leaving it to later sections to
put material into this framework. First, we should
understand that there are no causes that are aborigi-
nal in the sense that they have not themselves causes;
but there are some that may be treated as originating
forces for our purpose. There are, on the other hand,
the responses of the business system in the form of
rising or falling prices, the reaction of profits to
changes in volume of production and of volume of
production to changes in profits, the ordering of in-
creased capital equipment to satisfy an increasing
demand, etc. Some theories of business cycles run
mainly in terms of originating forces, others in terms
of the responses of the business system. It appears,
however, that cycles cannot be regarded as results of
one or the other of these groups of forces exclusively;
they are joint results of the two groups and of their
interaction.
The 'originating forces' are taken to include such
things as wars, the effect of the weather on crops,
certain elements in the processes of change in con-
sumers' wants and, with some qualifications, inven-
tions and the discovery of new goods.Secular
changes inprice-levels would be included, and
especially deflections or changes in the direction or
rate of change; together with the causes which bring
them about.
Itisnecessary, however,to avoid confusing
changes in consumerswants, of an 'originating'
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character, with changes in effective demand in the
market, or the development of invention of proc-
esses or goods with the rate at which these are actu-
ally installed, applied or exploited in industry.
Changes in effective demand are mainly the results
of the fact that in prosperous times people have
more income to spend on new goods and more con-
fidence to expand purchases on credit, and so buy
more. These conditions result in turn from changes
in the rate of productive activity. They are thus, in
the main, part of the system of business responses.
In the same way the rate at which new capital is
actually invested in installing new types of equip-
ment to utilize new inventions, and the rate at which
new goods are marketed, or even the times when
they are placed on the market, are all the results of
the prospects of business profits, which vary with
the varying phases of the business cycle itself.
The originating forces underlying these factors do
not appear directly and unmodified in the statistical
record, but they are nevertheless important. If. they
were acting on an economic structure with radically
different types of response from those of the present
form of business organization with its pseudo-indi-
vidualism and its partial freedom of enterprise and
limited competition, they would presumably pro-
duce results bearing little resemblance to those we
now witness.
Even steadily progressive changes may be sources
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of disturbance if the adjustments they make neces-
sary are sluggish or encounter resistance, allowing
pressures to accumulate until there is a more or less
sudden giving way. It is possible that the great col-
lapse of prices in the last three years is a case in point,
representing the final breaking-down of resistances
to the forces of post-War deflation, which may have
been gathering strength progressively for seven or
eight years previous to 1929. The resistances have
taken various forms. There were measures for the
valorization of specificcommodities. Currencies
were restored to a gold basis by the 'gold exchange'
system, whereby multiple burdens were placed on
the gold reserves of those countries whose exchanges
were used as means of stabilization of the currencies
of other countries. Systems of trade barriers and ex-
change restrictions have multiplied in a warfare of
mutual defeat, ultimately ending in a general crip-
pling of export markets for basic commodities en-
tering into international trade.
Another possible case is the development of labor-
saving machinery and processes. This has almost cer-
tainly made necessary larger adjustments than actu-
ally occurred in wages, in the length of the working
day, in consumption and in the development of new
goods. Such situations may give rise to recurrent
disturbances of an equilibrium which was only ap-
parent, and under cover of which tension had been
increasing. This appears to have been happening,
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for example, throughout the period from 1922to
1929. As another example, the great increase in dur-
able goods used has, as we shall see, aggravated one
of the most powerful elements of instability in our
system, and may be responsible for a lasting change
in the length and severity of business cycles.
The term 'originating' does not mean that the
forces so described are necessarily of superior im-
portance for the purposes of our study to the other
group described as'business responses'. Of the
'originating causes' some may be unavoidable, like
the uncertainties of the weather, or even desirable
in the sense that it would not be desirable to take
the steps which would in practice be necessary in
order to remove them, like the irregularities in-
separable from invention. On the other hand, the
factors concerned with the responses of the business
system may be the factors we can change, and so
utilize as working causes in the attempt to improve
conditions.
Furthermore, it seems almost certain at the start
that the factors which account for the effects of dis-
turbances taking the particular forms they do, and
producing cycles withtheirfairly rhythmic swings,
will be factors concerned with the responses of the
business system. We have apparently had cycles just
as long as we have had this type of business system.3
SeeWesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles: The Problem and its
Setting(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1927)ChapterH.
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Moreover, some of the originating causes, such as
wars and crops, clearly do not follow the same
rhythm as the shorter business cycles; as to the
others, there is no sufficient reason for thinking that
they do, and every reason for thinking that they do
not. Some new inventions mature very quickly,
others slowly, while major developments in the way
of new wants may require from a decade to a gener-
ation to reach their full potentialities. If these forces
produce the familiar business cycles, or play a part
in producing them, it is because they are acting on
a particular kind of business system, which reacts
to them in particular ways. As already remarked, on
a different system they would have different effects.
Our examination of the detailed statistical materials
affords no reason for modifying this conclusion.
As revealed by these studies, the responses of the
business system seem to form a closely-knit sequence
of cause and effect, in which a state of
tion appears to set in motion forces leading to over-
expansion, and this in turn to over-contraction once
more. In these swings, movements tend to be self-
reinforcing rather than self-limiting, until they have
gone so far that a marked reversal becomes inevi-
table. This is so true that it has proved possible to
construct theories of the self-generation of business
cycles by the business machinery itself, which have
more verisimilitude and have gained wider accep-
tance than those theories which interpret the timing
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of the cycle as wholly governed by outside originat-
ing causes, such as weather. And in any case these
latter theories, granting their truth, cannot explain
the particular characteristics of the cycle without
reference to the system of business responses. Sun-
spots might affect human affairs in a variety of ways,
but only in collaboration with a particular business
system could they conceivably bring about stock
exchange booms or widespread unemployment
among construction workers.
Whether the theories of self-generation are true
or not it is not necessary at this time to discover.
There are always independent disturbing influenèes
at work, and they modify the resulting course of
events. But it is significant that there is much less
variation in business cycles than in the outside in-
fluences which act upon them. Major or minor
wars, in which the country in question is either a
belligerent or a neutral, expanding or contracting
domestic farm production coordinated with like or
unlike movements of foreign production, upward
or downward secular price trends—all these occur
in an indefinite variety of combinations, while the
new goods and new processes which form the foci
of successive waves of expansion change from decade
to decade. But at whatever varied points and in
whatever varied forms such 'outside' factors have
their first impact on the business system, the result-
ant is to initiate or modify expansions and contrac-
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tions which spread rapidly through the system as a
whole, and which produce very similar symptoms.
Cyclical movements of prices go on through rising
or falling secular trends, though the relative lengths
of the upward and downward cyclical movements
are affected. Basic industries, factory employment,
general retail and wholesale trade, credit and securi-
ties markets—all show essentially similar movements.
All this argues that the responses of the business
system are more important in determining the re-
suits than the particular character of the original
disturbances, even if one grants provisionally that
without some kind of outside disturbance business
cycles would not be initiated in the first place,
orless regular suc-
cession of ups and downs.
The indicated probability isthat the average
period of these upward and downward swings is
determined by the character of business responses,
for example, the time required to finance capital
expansions and to construct new factory units or
new apartment buildings. The variations in the
timing of these movements appear to arise partly
from changes in the conditions governing these re-
sponses directly, and partly from the random be-
havior of the outside or originating causes. We must
also not forget the possibility that certain types of
response may have different periods from others,
with the result that changes in the timing and
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severity of cycles may be in part due to the varying
conjunctures of responses with different normal
periods. For example, among the more mechanical
features having to do with the construction of capi-
tal equipment and the using up of stocks of goods,
some of the more important may have periods the
combination of which tends naturally to produce a
cycle of about 40 months, while the more violent
psychological brainstorms represented by the stock
market mania of 1929andthe 'new era' delusion
which went with it, and similar waves in the past,
may require more time to work up their full
momentum—perhaps something like ten years. They
are, of course, subject to interruption by such out-
side disturbances as wars.
In general, the 'originating' causes may be pro-
visionally assumed to have two effects. The first is
to keep the responses of the business system from
dwindling away to zero, in case they would naturally
do so in time if left to themselves. Whether they
would do so or not is impossible to prove and is in
any case non-essential, since itis not allowed to
happen. There are continually-renewed disturbing
impulses. The second presumptive effect of these
'originating' causes is to induce variations in the
timing and severity of the resulting cycles.
Within this framework of theory, itself subject
to modification as we proceed, we may search for
causal factors of peculiar significance. They may beSTRATEGIC FACTORS IN BUSINESS CYCLES
definedasthose which, by variationsintheir
characteristic behavior, can bring about significant
differences in the course of business prosperity and
depression. The ones most worthy of study are those
which actually do vary, or which could be made to
vary—in other words, are subject to control. The
most useful thing to find would be an element which
was always present, whose behavior made a vital
difference to the resulting course of business, and
which could be controlled. But if a factor is always
present, and regularly behaves in the same way, it
occomes impossible to determine its significance by
the inductive method of observing the difference
that is made according as it is present or absent or
varies in its behavior. As a result, the more abstract
theoretical method may become necessary. And
among factors that are not always present, or that
vary their behavior from cycle to cycle, the multi-
tude of factors and variations is so great, and the
number of systematically observed cycles so small,
that the methods commonly characterized as induc-
tive face almost insuperable difficulties in attempt-
ing to isolate the significance of particular factors
by correlating their variations with variations in
the course of business. The data appear to be just
approaching thestatein which such methods,
handled with the utmost care, may yield some useful
results with respect to a few among the many ques-
tions which the business cycle raises.
[22